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<b>Fields</b>	Research: Microeconomic Theory Teaching: Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory	
<b>Education</b>	Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University Committee: Asher Wolinsky (Chair), Wojciech Olszewski, Bruno Strulovici	(anticipated) 2023
	B.A., Mathematics and Economics, Williams College	2017
<b>Fellowships &amp; Awards</b>	Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University GitHub Travel Grant Carl Van Duyne Prize Sentinels Fellowship	2022–2023 2020 2017 2015
<b>Teaching Experience</b>	Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University Intro to Microeconomics, Introduction to Applied Econometrics, Natural Resource Economics, Economics of Education, Marketing Analytics (Kellogg) Teaching Assistant, Williams College Intro to Development Economics, Probability	2018–Present   2015–2016
<b>Research Experience</b>	Research Assistant, Ivan A. Canay, Northwestern University	2021
<b>Conferences</b>	Conference on “Contests: Theory and Evidence”	
<b>Refereeing</b>	American Economic Review, Economics Letters, Journal of Open Source Software, Review of Economic Design	
<b>Working papers</b>	<p><b>“Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Spillovers”</b> with Maria Betto</p> <p><i>Abstract:</i> When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner’s reward. These <i>spillovers</i> can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in applications such as lobbying, warfare, labor tournaments, marketing, and R&amp;D races. To understand this influence, we study a general class of asymmetric, two-player all-pay contests where we allow for spillovers in each player’s reward. The link between participants’ efforts and rewards yields novel effects – in particular, players with higher costs and lower values than their opponent sometimes extract larger payoffs.</p> <p><b>“Covert Discrimination in All-pay Contests”</b> with Maria Betto</p> <p><i>Abstract:</i> A contest designer may wish to disadvantage a stronger player to improve competitiveness. We show this can be done in all-pay auctions such that the game is fair (i.e. symmetric) ex-ante. Yet, the stronger player is endogenously offered a lower prize in expectation. Thus, discrimination is <i>covert</i>.</p>	
<b>Languages</b>	English (native)	

## References

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